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ALTERNATIVES FOR RESOLVING
BUSINESS TRANSACTION DISPUTES
BERNARD H. GOLDSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
The congestion plaguing both federal and state courts has fo-
cused public attention on the efficiency of our judicial system.1
Awareness of the existing burden on the judiciary, coupled with
projections of increasingly frequent resort to litigation, has dis-
turbed the public, distressed the legal profession, and threatened
to diminish the quality of justice dispensed by our courts. The
problem is, of course, an old one, recalling what Shakespeare had
to say about our profession-"The first thing we do, let's kill all
the lawyers."' 3 Legal theorists, commentators, and the public have
criticized the present system while disagreeing as to how the situa-
tion should be remedied." Advocates of court reform, however,
* B.S.S., College of the City of New York, 1927; L.L.B., Columbia Law School, 1930;
Partner, Tenzer, Greenblatt, Fallon & Kaplan, New York City.
Grateful acknowledgement is made to Nathaniel T. Helman (Justice, New York Su-
preme Court, retired) for comments on an earlier draft. Acknowledgment also is made of the
research aid of Nicholas Kajon and Kevin J. Connolly, as well as of the members of the St.
John's Law Review staff.
See Note, The California Rent-A-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy Con-
siderations of Pay-As-You-Go Courts, 94 HARv. L. Rv. 1592, 1592 (1981). The judiciary's
burgeoning caseload has been traced to delays in the burdensome pretrial process. E. JOHN-
SON, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROCESSING OF CwIL Dis-
ptrrEs 2 (1978). Other causes, however, such as the increase in the number of complex mul-
tiparty cases litigated, also have contributed to the problem. See Janofsky, The "Big
Case"-A "Big Burden" on our Courts, 1980 UTAH L. RV. 719, 719; see also Cooke, The
Highways and Byways of Dispute Resolution, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 611, 611-12 (1981).
2 See Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274 (1982).
3 W. SHAKESPEARE, 11 Henry VI, IV.
4 See, e.g., E. GRIswoLD, THE SuPREME COURT'S CASE LOAD: CWVI RIGHTS AND OTHER
PROBLEMS 3-5 (1974); Bell, Crisis in the Courts: Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 3,
4-5 (1978); Janofsky, Reducing Court Costs and Delay, 71 ILL. B.J. 94, 94-95 (1982). The
inefficient use of time and money under the present system has been attributed to the acts
of attorneys, judges, and insurance companies, as well as to the court system and society in
general. See Williams, Court Delays and the High Cost of Civil Litigation: Causes, Alterna-
tives, Solutions, 71 ILL. B.J. 84, 85-86 (1982).
A number of simplified and expeditious procedures designed to preserve the essentials
of fair and effective process are being evaluated as possible reform measures. Janofsky,
supra, at 95-96. For example, one commentator's recommendations include mediation, in-
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most likely would agree with Chief Justice Burger's urgings that
greater use be made of alternatives to conventional litigation5
It is suggested that greater use of alternatives to the tradi-
tional court system would unburden the judiciary, streamline the
judicial process, and ultimately preserve the quality of the judicial
system. Furthermore, employment of a nonconventional forum
may serve the needs of individuals involved in a business dispute
more effectively than litigation, since the formal courtroom atmo-
sphere often hinders dispute resolution.' Therefore, increased
awareness of the accessibility of alternative modes of dispute set-
creased use of the telephone for motion disposition and various other pretrial procedures,
use of videotape for evidence depositions, and stricter adherence to trial dates. Williams,
supra, at 86-91. Another has noted that the application of management science concepts
such as queuing theory also might be effective in reducing judicial time consumption. See
Nagel, Predicting and Reducing Court-Case Time Through Simple Logic, 60 N.C.L. Rnv.
103, 123-45 (1981).
Evaluation of the court congestion problem has led to the suggestion that the federal
court caseload be decreased by eliminating historical grounds for federal jurisdiction that no
longer serve any useful purpose. See Bell, supra, at 9. For example, the burden of the
United States Supreme Court could be lightened by decreasing the instances of direct re-
view by the Court of district court decisions. See E. GRISWOLD, supra, at 6. A more radical
proposal advocates alteration of the three-tier federal court system by collapsing the circuit
courts into a single United States Court of Appeals with regional panels consisting of three
judges each. Id. at 14-15. Issues of national implication would be assigned to a national
panel of the United States Court of Appeals. Id. at 15. Legislation also is pending to ease
the Supreme Court's caseload by creating a temporary Intercircuit Tribunal of the United
States Courts of Appeals. S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 601-607 (1983); H.R. 1970, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see Hellman, Caseload, Conflicts, and Decisional Capacity: Does the
Supreme Court Need Help?, 67 JUDIcATuRE 29, 29 (1983).
In addition, some of the recently adopted amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were designed to combat the productivity crisis in the federal courts. See Marcus,
Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JuDicATuRE 363, 364 (1983).
5 See Burger, supra note 2, at 276. Chief Justice Burger's proposed solution concen-
trates on arbitration as an alternative to traditional litigation, especially in large, complex
commercial disputes. Id. at 276-77. The Chief Justice also advocates a system in which judi-
cial review of an award would be discouraged, citing the procedure existing in Michigan. Id.
at 277. As a step toward a more arbitration-oriented system, Chief Justice Burger advocates
alteration of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Alternative Means of
Dispute Resolution or, alternatively, establishment of a new commission including distin-
guished representatives of the bar and the business community as members. Id. In addition,
Chief Justice Burger urges greater utilization of the administrative process, as exemplified
by the worker's compensation boards, to resolve disputes. Id. at 275. The Chief Justice also
suggests examining the judicial systems of other countries that employ specialized court
systems or that limit the jury selection process to a few minutes, and evaluating such tech-
niques for possible American use. Burger Keynotes Current Problems in Administration of
Justice, N.J.L.J., Jan. 13, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
1 See Burger, supra note 2, at 275.
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tlement and sufficient familiarity with the nature and elements of
the mode best suited to the situation at hand will promote not only
the interests of disputants, but those of our society as well.
This Article will focus on the resolution of conflicts in the
commercial transactions arena. The court system should not be a
subject that concerns the lawyer only at the public interest level.
Important as that is, there are other considerations at the "law-in-
action" level-the place where the lawyer is concerned with negoti-
ating a contract-which should stimulate thought as to what hap-
pens to the contractual relationship if the parties have a dispute.
This Article will propose that the negotiating lawyer consider both
inherent and potential conflicts which may arise in a particular
transaction and that attention be given by the lawyer to the suita-
ble forums for dispute resolution should a controversy arise. The
Article then will discuss various dispute resolution techniques in
relation to different types of business disputes, and suggest viable
and appropriate nonconventional forums for the types of conflict
discussed.
ANALYZING THE COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION
An examination of the nature and characteristics of the basic
kinds of disputes that can arise in business transactions is a neces-
sary prelude to an analysis of the available modes of resolution. In
business disputes, the controversial issues commonly spring from
differing expectations between the parties concerning the desired
outcome of the transaction or series of transactions in question.
Such differences in expectations may occur over the interpretation
of contractual terms, the sufficiency of the contractually required
performance, or both interpretation and performance combined.
Each of these three possibilities merits a brief explanation.
Since words lack the rigor of mathematical formulas, it virtu-
ally is impossible to eliminate vagueness and ambiguity from writ-
ten communication in every instance. Interpretation disputes
therefore often arise over the meaning of the words employed in a
contract. The controversy is not whether a certain act or whether
certain conduct took place, which if it did would concededly be
embraced within the contract, but rather how shall a situation that
has arisen or that periodically may arise under an ongoing contract
be treated. For example, under a typical rent escalation clause, the
tenant agrees to pay a portion of subsequent increases in operating
1983]
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expenses for the building in which leased premises are situated.7
Such clauses typically describe these increases in elusive language,
fostering different interpretations of the clause by each party.8
"First refusal" clauses, which grant the tenant the opportunity to
purchase the property if the landlord receives an offer to purchase
from a third party,9 also are fertile ground for interpretation dis-
putes, since the word "offer" may be defined differently in various
contexts.10 It may, for instance, refer to a firm offer in the legal
sense, or merely to a proposal to negotiate with the intention of
endeavoring to make a firm deal. The resolution of such a contro-
versy thus lies in defining contract terms in a manner which re-
flects the understanding of the parties.
On the other hand, the controversy may not have its emphasis
on the agreement itself, but rather on the performance under the
agreement. Such a controversy may arise over the question of
See, e.g., Avon Prods., Inc. v. Solow, 79 App. Div. 2d 53, 53-54, 435 N.Y.S.2d 728, 728
(1st Dep't), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 637, 425 N.E.2d 894, 442 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1981) (involving a rent
escalation clause that established a direct correlation between wage increases for janitorial
staff and tenant's rent); City of Hope, Inc. v. Fisk Bldg. Assocs., 63 App. Div. 2d 946, 946,
406 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474 (1st Dep't 1978) (involving a rent escalation clause based on con-
sumer price index, operating expenses, real estate taxes, and increased cost of electricity).
8 See, e.g., George Backer Management Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 46 N.Y.2d 211, 217,
385 N.E.2d 1062, 1065, 413 N.Y.S.2d 135, 138 (1978) (tenant's claim of ambiguity in escala-
tion clause rejected); Panorama Residential Protective Ass'n v. Panorama Corp., 28 Wash.
App. 923, 929, 627 P.2d 121, 126 (1981) (clause stating that rent "shall be adjusted" in
proportion to the cost of living index construed as mandatory and as not permissive), modi-
fied, 97 Wash. 2d 23, 640 P.2d 1057 (1982).
9 See W. BuRBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 162 (3d ed. 1965). The
principle of "first refusal" has been applied to an option to rent, see Amco Plastic Materials,
Inc. v. Slone, 5 App. Div. 2d 817, 818, 170 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619 (1st Dep't 1958), an option to
renew a lease, see Forma v. Moran, 273 App. Div. 818, 819, 76 N.Y.S.2d 232, 233 (2d Dep't
1948), and an option to buy stock, see Ward v. Coward, 281 App. Div. 798, 798, 119
N.Y.S.2d 492, 493 (4th Dep't 1953).
'0 See 1 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 27 (3d ed. 1957). For a proposal to
constitute a legal offer, the offeror must either make the offeree a promise for a specific
consideration or state the consideration that he will give for a certain promise. Id. § 23. In
the context of sales transactions, the offeror must show at least a present intention to prom-
ise to sell at a specified price. Thomas J. Sheehan Co. v. Crane Co., 418 F.2d 642, 645 (8th
Cir. 1969). In Sheehan, an oral quotation indicated only a future intention to sell, and
therefore was considered merely an invitation to make an offer. Id. The quotation lacked
the definiteness required for an offer, since it failed to specify the time of acceptance, quan-
tity, payment terms, and time of performance. Id.; see United States v. Braunstein, 75 F.
Supp. 137, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), appeal dismissed, 168 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1948). One court
has stated that "[a] mere expression of intention or general willingness to do something,"
conditioned on an event or in exchange for something to be received, does not constitute an
offer. Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 440 F.2d 21, 29 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 403 U.S. 906 (1971).
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whether a real estate broker has earned his commission under the
terms of the brokerage contract. For example, if the broker pro-
duces a customer with whom the broker's principal refuses to deal,
the broker must be able to prove that his performance satisfied the
broker's engagement under the contract with the principal in order
to support the claim for a commission.11 In order to establish his
performance of the broker's engagement, the broker will have to
show that the customer and the principal were in substantial
agreement as to essential terms of bargain, that the broker was the
procuring cause of bringing about agreement on those terms, and
that the customer had sufficient financial capability to comply with
those terms. 12 Settlement of the dispute between broker and prin-
cipal thus will focus on the quality of the broker's performance.
Many controversies feature disagreement over both contract
interpretation and performance. Such disputes can arise in many
settings, and are typical of the construction contract. Since a con-
struction contract requires the integration of architectural specifi-
cations with the formal legal contract, s determining the terms of
n The generally stated rule for determining whether a broker has earned a broker's
commission is whether the broker has produced a buyer 'ready, willing, and able' to buy at
the price and terms stated by the seller in the listing agreement. Christo v. Ramada Inns,
Inc., 609 F.2d 1058, 1061 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Simon v. H.K. Porter Co., 407 Pa. 359, 362,
180 A.2d 227, 229 (1962)); Fleming Realty & Ins., Inc. v. Evans, 199 Neb. 440, 442, 259
N.W.2d 604, 606 (1977); E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNTRACrs
309 (3d ed. 1980); Goldstein, When Does a Real Estate Broker Earn his Commission?, 27
PRAC. LAW. 43 (1981).
12 See Van Riper v. Agabian, 57 App. Div. 2d 923, 923, 395 N.Y.S.2d 59, 60 (2d Dep't
1977). The requirement of financial capability is satisfied if the prospective buyer has the
means of paying the downpayment and the deferred payments, when due, as required under
the proposed contract of sale. Fleming Realty & Ins., Inc. v. Evans, 199 Neb. 440, 442, 259
N.W.2d 604, 606 (1977). A mere plan to raise the requisite funds is insufficient. See, e.g.,
Nelson v. Bolton, 72 Ill. App. 3d 519, 526, 391 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1979) (upholding denial of
real estate broker's commission when financial ability of purchaser rested on third persons
not bound to furnish the funds); Globerman v. Lederer, 281 App. Div. 39, 42, 117 N.Y.S.2d
549, 551 (1st Dep't 1952) (must show details from which jury can infer financial ability).
The buyer's credit rating also must be examined. See, e.g., Allied Realty, Inc. v. Boyer, 302
N.W.2d 774, 777 (N.D. 1981). Nor is financial capacity conclusively established by examina-
tion of the income-producing capabilities of the property to be purchased. Id. at 778. See
generally Goldstein, Proof of Financial Ability of the Purchaser in Real Estate Brokerage
Actions, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 26, 1954, at 4, col. 1.
" See I. WERBIN, LEGAL GUME FOR CONTRACTORS, ARCHITECTS, AND ENGINEERS 16-19
(1961). A construction contract may well consist of a basic agreement, architectural plans,
project specifications, and general conditions to which all transactions comprising the pro-
ject are to conform. See id. at 14-17. The resolution of inconsistencies between the contract
documents may be accomplished by including clauses governing interpretation of the con-
tract in the contract itself. See J. SwEEr, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARcTrrECTuRE, ENGINEERING
1983]
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the agreement may not be an easy task. Performance is an issue as
well, since there may be questions as to whether the completed
structure is in substantial conformity with the contract as an inte-
grated agreement of all the elements of the bargain. 14 Disputes
such as these must be resolved by dividing them into their compo-
nent problems and resolving each problem separately. The con-
tract's terms must be defined before attempting to ascertain how
closely they have been met.
The above classification-which may be called a functional
view of the litigatory process relative to a business controversy-is
not intended to be a rigorous one. Rather, it is offered as an ap-
proximate guide in assessing the quality of the controversy, since it
may be an aid in making a judgment as to where one should go to
resolve differences, though not necessarily a determinative factor.
An inquiry into the nature of a dispute also must involve con-
sidering the needs and expectations of the parties and the nature
of their relationship. An individual with a small amount at stake in
a dispute, for example, is likely to seek a more expedient and less
expensive resolution technique than litigation. Conversely, a party
with a large financial stake in a transaction may be more willing to
resort to litigation to protect his investment. For example, a manu-
facturer of automobiles whose supplier has breached the supplier's
contract to provide steel may be able to acquire steel from an al-
ternate source, continue production, and await the ultimate settle-
ment of the contract dispute at trial. The amount of time in which
a dispute can be settled also may be determinative in forum
selection.
AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 342 (2d ed. 1977). Another method of resolving contract
inconsistencies is to assign the power of deciding which document controls to the architect.
See id.
14 The doctrine of substantial performance is applied to ascertain whether a party has
satisfied all contract conditions. J. CALAMAm & J. PElmLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 410 (2d
ed. 1977). Minor deviations from contract terms are seldom construed as a breach of con-
tract. See id. A wilful deviation, however, may be found to constitute a breach depending on
the facts of the particular case. See, e.g., Groves v. John Wunder Co., 205 Minn. 163, 165,
286 N.W. 235, 236 (1939) (wilful failure to resurface plot after removing sand and gravel
held to be material breach of contract for removal of sand and gravel); Jacob & Youngs v.
Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 244, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921) (inadvertent use of brand of pipe of
similar quality but with different brand name than that specified in contract held to be
substantial performance). In Jacob & Youngs, Judge Cardozo noted that "the purpose to be
served, the desire to be gratified, the excuse for deviation from the letter, and the cruelty of
enforced adherence" must be weighed in ascertaining substantial compliance with a con-
tract. 230 N.Y. at 243, 129 N.E. at 892.
[Vol. 58:69
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The business relationship of the contracting parties is another
important consideration in selecting a forum. Thus, if the parties
based their contract on principles of custom and usage in the
trade, a method of conflict resolution not bound by strict rules of
judicial interpretation and principles of precedent is more likely to
effectuate their expectations and produce a result consistent with
the contract's underlying rationale. If the parties have drafted
their agreement in reliance upon traditional legal principles, how-
ever, use of an alternative forum may not lead to a result that con-
forms to the expectations of the parties.
The time framework of the parties' business relationship also
will affect their choice of forum. If the likelihood exists that the
parties will be involved in future or recurring transactions with
each other, a forum less likely to disrupt a continuing relationship
between the parties should be employed in lieu of litigation. These
examples illustrate why knowledge of the parties' needs must be
coupled with an understanding of how the various means of dis-
pute resolution can be utilized to meet those needs before an intel-
ligent choice of forum can be made. Accordingly, an inquiry into
the characteristics of each forum is necessary.
MODES OF RESOLUTION
Formal litigation-the "fight" theory of conflict resolution-is,
of course, an available form of redress for all types of conflicts.
Litigation, however, necessarily involves pleadings, discovery, hear-
ings and other costly time-consuming procedures. As a result, liti-
gants often become frustrated and acquiesce in unsatisfactory com-
promises.15 In order to avoid such frustration and to prevent
injustices, Chief Justice Burger has urged disputants to resort to
alternative modes of conflict resolution in lieu of the litigation pro-
cess whenever such alternatives are more efficient in resolving con-
troversies without any sacrifice of a just result."6 In our system of
justice, benchmarks for permissible conduct come from the deci-
sional process of our judicial machinery. Judicial resolution of con-
"5 See Burger, supra note 2, at 275. Physicians have observed that the stress of partici-
pating in a lawsuit can cause "litigation neuroses" in litigants, lawyers, and lay and expert
witnesses. Id. Thus, even a satisfactory dispute resolution is diminished in value as a result
of the emotional and financial drain on litigants. Id. at 274. Business entities suffer an anal-
ogous drain from litigation, since involvement in a lawsuit diverts the money and manpower
of a company away from business pursuits, thus threatening productivity. Id. at 275.
,6 Id. at 275; see supra note 5.
1983]
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flicts is not functionally obsolete. The challenge is to improve the
efficiency of the judicial system, as is the intent of the Chief Jus-
tice, by employing other methods of conflict resolution, such as ar-
bitration, 17 appraisal,' simplified statutory procedures, 9 rent-a-
judge programs 0 and mediation.2 Since the characteristics of
these alternatives must be understood in order to determine when
their use might be advantageous, a brief examination of each is in
order.
Arbitration
Arbitration is a non-judicial proceeding in which disputing
parties submit their conflict to an impartial person or group of per-
sons for a final and binding resolution instead of to a judicial tri-
bunal,22 and must be invoked by voluntary agreement of the par-
ties. 23 If one of the parties refuses to honor a contract provision
requiring disputes to be arbitrated, the provision can be enforced
by court order;24 if one of the parties is unwilling to abide by the
17 See infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
22 Although recorded instances of dispute resolution by means of arbitration can be
found in the Bible, see 1 Kings 3:16-28, and fifth century Athens, see THE RHETORICAL ARm-
TOTLE 77-78 (D. Appleton ed. 1932), modern arbitration has its roots in Roman law, Jalet,
Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519, 519 (1960).
Arbitration in this country is said to have been heralded in its modem form by the
enactment of the New York Arbitration Act in 1920. M. DOMKE, COMMERcIAL ARBrrRATION
18 (1965). The United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925) (cur-
rent version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976)), which applied only to admiralty disputes and trans-
actions "in commerce," see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
401 (1967), likewise encouraged arbitration by making arbitration agreements enforceable, 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1976); see Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04, 404 n.12; Moseley v. Electronic &
Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1963). In 1926, the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation was founded. F. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARniTRATION, ITS HISTORY, FUNCTI oSs AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 17 (1948). This organization quickly assumed its present function of promot-
ing and coordinating commercial arbitration on a national scale. See id. at 22-23.
213 See, e.g., F. KELLOR, supra note 22, at 26.
24 See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967)
(court shall order parties to proceed with arbitration unless it is determined that contro-
versy centers around the agreement to arbitrate); see 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (before granting
order to proceed with arbitration, court must find "that the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue"). While compliance with ex-
press conditions precedent to arbitration ordinarily is a question "for the court, not the
arbitrator," Opan Realty Corp. v. Pedrone, 36 N.Y.2d 943, 944, 335 N.E.2d 854, 855, 373
N.Y.S.2d 549, 550 (1975), nevertheless the determination of the existence of such express
[Vol. 58:69
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arbitrator's award, the award similarly may be enforced.25 It there-
fore is important that the negotiating lawyer-as much as the liti-
gator-be fully familiar with the ramifications of including an arbi-
tration clause in the agreement that is being negotiated." In sum,
conditions precedent has been left to the arbitrators as a question of contract interpretation,
see Pearl St. Dev. Corp. v. Conduit & Found. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 359 N.E.2d 693,
695, 391 N.Y.S.2d 98, 100 (1976); see also Goldstein, The Power of Arbitrators in Commer-
cial Arbitration, 26 PRAc. LAW. 69, 72-73 (1980); ef. United Nations Dev. Corp. v. Norkin
Plumbing Co., 45 N.Y.2d 358, 363, 380 N.E.2d 253, 255, 408 N.Y.S.2d 424, 427 (1978) (con-
tractual limitation on time of filing for arbitration is question for arbitrator, since limitation
is not an "express" condition precedent).
25 At common law, the prevailing rule was that arbitration agreements were revocable
at will by either party at any time before the award was rendered. See, e.g., Standard Mag-
nesium Corp. v. Fuchs, 251 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1957). Today, courts in many jurisdic-
tions have the power to sanction enforcement of arbitration agreements by reason of statu-
tory enactment. See Lippman, Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Settlement: Some
Selected Perspectives, 24 Mn. L. Rv. 215, 217 (1972); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (arbitration clause enforced in light of uncertainty of applica-
ble law); Warren Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp., 471 F.2d 1304, 1307 (1st Cir. 1973) (public con-
tracts bonding statute will not bar enforcement of arbitration clause).
26 Pennsylvania has a compulsory arbitration system that has drawn widespread atten-
tion for its provisions designed to reduce court congestion. In reality, the Pennsylvania sys-
tem is "compulsory mediation," since there can be a trial de novo so that the finality of the
ordinary consensual arbitration does not prevail. It is of interest, however, to note briefly
the substance of the Pennsylvania system, which requires arbitration of all claims in which
the amount in controversy is insufficient to establish state court jurisdiction. See PA. R. Civ.
P. 1301-1314; see also Reynolds, Compulsory Arbitration in Montgomery County, 19 SHIN-
GLE 77 (1956); Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small
Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARv. L. REv. 448, 448-49 (1961); Recent Decision, Arbitra-
tion-Compulsory Arbitration in Pennsylvania-Arbitration Act-De Novo Appeals, 16
DuQ. L. REv. 443, 451-52 (1977). The Pennsylvania system was designed not only to free the
courts to handle larger cases and perform other judicial functions, but also to satisfy the
need for prompt resolution of small claims cases. In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 229, 112 A.2d
625, 629, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). Under this system, each common pleas
court may determine whether arbitration shall be permitted within its jurisdiction, what
kinds of cases shall be arbitrated, and the jurisdictional amount to be fixed pursuant to
section 7361(b) of the Judicial Code. PA. R. Civ. P. 1301 note; see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7361(b) (Purdon 1982). Three-judge panels are appointed from a list of available arbitrators.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1302(b). Local rules govern the procedure for fixing the date, time, and place
of the hearing, but a minimum of 30 days written notice to the parties is required in all
localities. Id. 1303(a). Once the Board is convened for a hearing, the arbitrators make an
award unless the court orders a continuance, even if one party is absent or is unprepared.
Id. 1303(b). Generally, the rules of evidence are followed during the arbitration hearing. Id.
1305. Awards shall dispose of all claims for relief and shall be made promptly upon termina-
tion of the hearing. Id. 1306. Appeals take the form of a request for a jury trial de novo. Id.
1311(a). If no appeal is taken within 30 days of the entry of the award on the docket, the
prothonotary will enter judgment on the award. Id. 1307(c). However, if the record and the
award disclose an obvious and unambiguous mistake, the court still may modify the award.
Id. 1307(d). Of the other states, only Arizona has enacted a statute similar to the Penn-
sylvania Compulsory Arbitration Act, See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-133 (1982). New York,
however, has empowered the chief administrator of its court system to establish a similar
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it is a consensual arrangement when we think of the employment
of arbitration in business transactions, and the focus of our atten-
tion should be in that direction.
Arbitration offers the advantages of privacy, convenience and
a reduction of formality. Flexibility is another important advan-
tage of arbitration. Though an arbitrator acts as judge of both the
law and the facts,28 he is not bound by the principle of stare deci-
sis in making an award.2 Nor is he precluded by tenets of substan-
tive law from ordering certain forms of relief.30 For example, al-
though a court may be reluctant to enforce a restrictive covenant
in an employment contract on public policy grounds, an arbitrator,
not bound by such considerations, is likely to order adherence to
the restriction, and a court then could give sanction to this
award.31 Indeed, the conventional equity rule, that equity will not
program. See [1983] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 28.
27 See, e.g., Lippman, supra note 25, at 218.
28 See id. at 217. Though the arbitrator must evaluate legal and factual questions, the
purpose of arbitration is to render an award that is fair and just, not to make findings of
fact and conclusions of law. In re Curtis, 64 Conn. 501, 512-13, 30 A. 769, 770-71 (1894);
McKnight v. McCullough, 21 Iowa 111, 114 (1866); Mangum v. Mangum, 151 N.C. 270, 271-
72, 65 S.E. 1004, 1004-05 (1909). While distinctions between law and fact issues have little
relevance to the arbitration process, see W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATONS AND
AWARDS 654-55 (1930), arbitration has been conceded to be "a legitimate and conclusive
method" of resolving such issues, 27 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 350, 351 (1953); see also In re
Sprinzen, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 629, 389 N.E.2d 456, 458, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976-77 (1979) (arbitra-
tor's findings of fact and law will generally be upheld).
28 The arbitrator may consider rules of contract law, practice, custom, and general prin-
ciples of equity, as well as personal concepts of justice, public policy, logic and ethics.
Hepburn & Loiseaux, The Nature of the Arbitration Process, 10 VAND. L. Rav. 657, 665-66
(1957).
Justice Rehnquist has suggested that as a result of the emphasis placed on written judi-
cial opinions, a judge subconsciously may place scholarship above the need for a speedy
trial. Rehnquist, A Jurist's View of Arbitration, 32 ARB. J. 1, 6 (1977). He therefore views as
an advantage the fact that arbitration "need not produce a body of decisional law" to guide
the future conduct of lawyers and litigators. Id. at 5.
30 See, e.g., Grayson-Robinson, Inc. v. Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 136, 168 N.E.2d
377, 379, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304-05 (1960) (arbitration award of specific performance of
building contract enforced by courts).
31 E.g., Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 631, 389 N.E.2d 456, 460, 415 N.Y.S.2d
974, 978 (1979); see also Sperry Int'l Trade Inc. v. Government of Isr., 689 F.2d 301, 306 (2d
Cir. 1982) (courts reluctant to review arbitrator's award absent a showing of wilful violation
of law). Like a court, an arbitrator may refuse to enforce a clause he finds unconscionable.
See Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 457, 255 N.E.2d
168, 171, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934, 939 (1969), modified, 26 N.Y.2d 842, 285 N.E.2d 87, 309
N.Y.S.2d 589 (1970). But a grant of punitive damages by an arbitrator may be reversed by a
reviewing court. Lippman, supra note 25, at 217 n.18; see Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40
N.Y.2d 354, 357, 353 N.E.2d 793, 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 832-33 (1976). However, liquidated
damages may be awarded by an arbitrator, e.g., Bruno v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 256 F.
1983] ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
make a decree requiring continual supervision, has been held not
to apply to an award in arbitration that requires continual per-
formance.2 An arbitrator thus has more discretion than does a
court to tailor the remedy to fit the needs of the parties, according
to the equities of the situation. Invoking arbitration also can in-
crease the range of potential solutions for a dispute. Since an arbi-
ter's decision is final, a court will vacate it only if the award is
"completely irrational" or the arbitrator has otherwise exceeded
his authority.33 It thus is possible for a court, by enforcing an arbi-
trator's award, to provide a kind of remedy it could not otherwise
have granted under conventional practice.
Arbitration often may prove to be the most appropriate mode
of resolution for all three kinds of contract disputes. For instance,
when a conflict arises over the interpretation of a contract based
on principles of trade custom and usage, an arbitrator, free to ig-
nore conventional judicial principles, may ascribe a meaning to the
controverted terms that is more consistent with the parties' inten-
tions than an interpretation that a court could make. Arbitration
also offers an appropriate forum for the resolution of the differ-
ences revealed during the course of performance. An example of
such a situation is a construction contract, where an interruption
of performance caused by a disagreement could have disastrous
Supp. 865, 869 (E.D. Pa. 1966), and courts also have allowed arbitrators great discretion in
fixing consequential damages, e.g., United Buying Serv. Int'l Corp. v. United Buying Serv.,
Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 75, 79, 327 N.Y.S.2d 7, 12 (1st Dep't 1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 822, 286
N.E.2d 284, 334 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1972).
S2 See Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 137, 168 N.E.2d
377, 378-79, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303, 306 (1960).
3- See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7511(b) (McKinney 1980). The Civil Practice Law
allows a court to vacate an award if it finds that a party's rights were prejudiced by: (1)
"corruption, fraud or misconduct," (2) partiality, (3) an arbitrator who exceeded his author-
ity, or (4) failure to follow proper procedure. Id. Broad discretion has long been a feature of
arbitration. See, e.g., Taylor v. Fitz Coal Co., 618 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Ky. 1981) (absent "gross
mistake of law or fact" amounting to fraud or partiality, courts may not set aside arbitration
awards); see San Martine Compania De Navigacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminal Ltd., 293
F.2d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1961); Spring Cotton Mills v. Buster Boy Suit Co., 300 N.Y. 586,
586-87, 89 N.E.2d 877, 878 (1949) (arbitration award is a complete and binding determina-
tion not to be disturbed merely because one party defaulted); see also Morgan v. Mather, 30
Eng. Rep. 500, 502 (1792) (arbitration award to be set aside only if contrary to law, or if
corruptions, injustice or admitted mistake occurs). One reason for permitting such latitude
is that the parties to an arbitration have by prior agreement consented to accept the arbitra-
tor's award as final and binding. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURi, How ARBrrRATiON WORKS 183
(3d ed. 1973). However, since the arbitrator is selected by the parties, he is held to stringent
standards of impartiality. Lippman, supra note 25, at 218 n.23; see Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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consequences. Arbitration best serves the parties' needs in such a
case by providing a forum for the parties to resolve their differ-
ences while continuing the work, or by enabling parties to assert a
claim and preserve the right to arbitrate until a time after the job
is completed. In addition, arbitration may prove to be a more ap-
propriate forum than the courtroom to resolve technical or scien-
tific questions related to either contract interpretation or perform-
ance. By selecting arbitrators experienced in the technical areas
involved, the parties can greatly expedite the attainment of a mu-
tually acceptable end to their controversy.
Appraisal
Occasions arise for the need to appraise the value of a prop-
erty interest. Thus, for the purpose of revising rental under a long-
term lease, it is not uncommon for the lease to require periodic
review of the rental reserved. 4 If the parties are unable to agree on
a rent revision by bargain, the lease may provide that in such a
circumstance the differences are to be resolved by appraisal, with
each side appointing an appraiser.3 5 The rent is determined by a
percentage of the land value established by the appraisal.s6 If the
34 See Eltinge and Graziadio Dev. Co. v. Childs, 49 Cal. App. 3d 294, 296-97, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 370 (1975) (60-year lease with rent adjustments every 5 years); Bullock's, Inc. v.
Security-First Nat'l Bank, 160 Cal. App. 2d 277, 279, 325 P.2d 185, 186-87 (1958) (50-year
lease with rent adjustment every 10 years); Hung Wo Ching v. Hawaiian Restaurants, Ltd.,
50 Hawaii 563, 564, 445 P.2d 370, 371 (1968) (25-year lease with adjustments every 5 years);
Schipper & Block, Inc. v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 5 IM. App. 3d 209, 210, 283 N.E.2d 81, 82
(1972) (99-year lease with rent redetermination every 10 years based on reappraisal of prop-
erty). Very often this type of "appraisal machinery" is used by parties because it is unsound
to commit themselves to fixed rents for periods far into the future. Marceron v. Chevy
Chase Servs., Inc., 258 F.2d 155, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1958). For an excellent discussion of the
problems involved in long-term leases and an approach to their solution, see Denz, Lease
Provisions Designed to Meet Changing Economic Conditions, 1952 U. ILL. L.F. 344, 363-67;
Hecht, Variable Rental Provisions in Long Term Ground Leases, 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 625,
639-92 (1972).
11 See Hung Wo Ching v. Hawaiian Restaurants, Ltd., 50 Hawaii 563, 564, 445 P.2d
370, 371 (1968); Diamond Parking, Inc. v. Martin Theaters, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 273, 275,
647 P.2d 47, 48 (1982). For a general discussion of commercial arbitration in the field of real
estate, see AMERICAN ARBITRATION AssOCIATION, ARBITRATION AND THE LAw 28-37 (1982).
36 See Marceron v. Chevy Chase Servs., Inc., 258 F.2d 155, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (rental
to be determined by computing 8% of a certain fraction of appraised land value); Hung Wo
Ching, 50 Hawaii at 564, 445 P.2d at 371 (rental is 6% of appraised value for each rental
period); 873 Third Ave. Corp. v. Madison Assocs., 56 App. Div. 2d 748, 748, 391 N.Y.S.2d
1007, 1007 (1st Dep't 1977) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (lease provided for rental at 6% of the
appraised value of the land per year). For a discussion of what is considered in making an
appraisal, see Abelmann, How to Estimate Highest and Best Use, in J. BABCOCK, VALUATION
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two appraisers are unable to agree, there is a provision for the se-
lection of a third appraiser,3 7 and the agreed value of any two be-
comes the value used for the purpose of fixing the rent. "
The general rule is that appraisal cannot be compelled where a
party refuses to engage in it pursuant to the terms of the con-
tract.39 In such an event, the value determination to be made by
the appraisers would be made instead by the court.40 In California
and New York, however, there is a statutory sanction employed to
enforce agreements to submit to appraisal.41 The hostility toward
enforcing agreements for appraisal absent a statutory sanction
probably is a remnant of the hostility, which existed before mod-
ern practice, to specifically enforcing agreements to submit to
arbitration.42
Under New York law, an appraisal award is not enforceable in
the same manner as a conventional arbitration award.43 The sub-
OF REAL ESTATE 6 (1958).
37 Bullocks, Inc. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 160 Cal. App. 2d at 279, 325 P.2d at 186-
87 n.1 (if after 20 days the two appointed appraisers cannot agree, they immediately shall
appoint a third, and the decision of any two will be binding); Schipper & Block, Inc. v.
Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 122 IM. App. 2d 34, 38, 256 N.E.2d 854, 855 (1970) (provision for
appraisers to appoint a third appraiser, with a majority decision binding). Many leases pro-
vide for the automatic appointment of a third appraiser by the two appraisers appointed by
the parties. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern Univ., 36 IMI. App. 3d 165, 167, 344
N.E.2d 52, 55 (1976); Diamond Parking, Inc. v. Martin Theaters, 32 Wash. App. 273, 275,
647 P.2d 47, 48 (1982); see also Hecht, supra note 34, at 680.
" See, e.g., European-American Banking Corp. v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 109 Misc.
2d 615, 616, 442 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1981), see supra note 37.
39 See, e.g., In re Delnar Box Co., 309 N.Y. 60, 64-65, 127 N.E.2d 808, 811 (1955); see
Note, The Specific Performance of Appraisal Contracts-A Further Repudiation of Miles
v. Gery, 33 VA. L. REv. 494, 497 (1947).
40 See Hecht, supra note 34, at 683-85.
41 See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7601 (McKinney 1980). Section 7601 of the New York
Civil Practice Law provides courts with the power to order specific performance of appraisal
agreements. Clark v. Kraftco Corp., 323 F. Supp. 358, 361 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 447
F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1971); 873 Third Ave. Corp. v. Madison Assocs., 56 App. Div. 2d 748, 748,
391 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1007 (1st Dep't 1977) (Murphy, J., dissenting); CAL. Civ. PROC CODE §
1281 (West 1982); see Sauter v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 25, 28, 82 Cal. Rptr. 395,
396-97 (1969).
42 Specific performance of an agreement to allow an appraisal formerly would not be
granted. In re Delmar Box Co., 309 N.Y. 60, 63-65, 127 N.E.2d 808, 810-11 (1955); In re
Fletcher, 237 N.Y. 440, 445-46, 143 N.E. 248, 250 (1924). For an excellent discussion of
Delmar, see Sturges & Sturges, Appraisals of Loss and Damage Under Insurance Policies,
13 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 17-46 (1958). See generally Note, supra note 39, at 502-04.
43 Clark v. Kraftco Corp., 323 F. Supp. 358, 361 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 447 F.2d
933 (2d Cir. 1971). Review of appraisal is governed by different and broader standards than
is arbitration. In re Penn Cent. Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 120, 126-27, 436 N.E.2d 512, 516, 451
N.Y.S.2d 62, 66 (1982); Gervant v. New England Fire Ins. Co., 306 N.Y. 393, 399-400, 118
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stantive determination of the appraisers is open to judicial review,
unlike the limited procedural objections permissible on a review of
an arbitration award." The reason for the distinction has been
that in appraisal, unlike arbitration, there is no oath taken by the
appraisers, no hearing, and no requirement that the determination
be based on submitted evidence.45
The employment of the appraisal procedure as a method of
conflict resolution would suggest that the parties, having been una-
ble to resolve their differences consensually, now look to the ap-
praisers to give finality to the resolution of the difference.46 If that
is the rationale for the invocation of the clause, then the way to
avoid the uncertainties inherent in appraisal would be to use con-
ventional arbitration, with its circumscribed area of judicial review
of an award-review limited primarily to procedural deficien-
cies-provided the arbitrators have not produced a "completely ir-
rational" result.47
N.E.2d 574, 577 (1954). The reason most often offered by the courts for the difference in
approach is that arbitration entails the submission of the whole controversy, while appraisal
extends only to the specific question of cash value. In re Delmar Box Co., 309 N.Y. 60, 63,
127 N.E.2d 808, 811 (1955).
"' When a contract employs a general arbitration clause, judicial review is limited be-
cause the power of the arbitrator is so extensive. See, e.g., Belardinelli v. Werner Continen-
tal, Inc., 128 N.J. Super. 1, 15, 318 A.2d 777, 782 (1974); Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382,
384, 278 N.E.2d 633, 634, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419-20 (1972); Plaza Hotel Assocs. v. Wellington
Assocs., 22 N.Y.2d 846, 849, 239 N.E.2d 736, 738, 293 N.Y.S.2d 108, 111 (1968) (Breitel, J.,
dissenting). It is clear that if an appraiser oversteps his limited scope of authority the courts
are free to take action. Id. (Breitel, J., dissenting). The rule seems to be the same in Califor-
nia. See Stockwell v. Equitable Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 134 Cal. App. 534, 540, 25 P.2d
873, 876 (1933).
" See In re Penn Cent. Corp., 56 N.Y.2d at 126, 436 N.E.2d at 516, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
"6 For a rather generous statement of the finality of an appraiser's decision, a view of
finality that accords with the intent of the contracting parties, see Hirt v. Hervey, 118 Ariz.
543, 545, 578 P.2d 624, 626 (1978) ("overwhelming weight of authority supports the view
that decisions of an appraiser ... are entitled to the same degree of finality accorded deci-
sions of arbitrators"), and Loyalty Dev. Co. v. Wholesale Motors, Inc., 615 Hawaii 483, 487-
88, 605 P.2d 925, 928-29 (1980) (appraisers' determination entitled to binding effect of court
judgment). Parties appoint appraisers because of their expertise in settling disputes; liti-
gants seek to make appraisals final in an effort to avoid litigation. See Moore v. Eadie, 245
N.Y. 166, 171, 156 N.E. 653, 655 (1927); Ice Serv. Co. v. Phipps Estates, 245 N.Y. 393, 396-
97, 157 N.E. 506, 507-08 (1927); European-American Banking Corp. v. Chock Full O'Nuts
Corp., 109 Misc. 2d 615, 619, 442 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1981).
'" A court can overturn an arbitration award only if the award is "completely irra-
tional." See Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 384, 278 N.E.2d 633, 634, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418,
419-20 (1972); In re Granite Worsted Mills, Inc., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 456-57, 255 N.E.2d 168,
170-71, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934, 938-39 (1969); In re National Cash Register Co., 8 N.Y.2d 377,
383, 171 N.E.2d 302, 305, 208 N.Y.S.2d 951, 955 (1960); In re S & W Fine Foods Inc., 7
N.Y.2d 1018, 1019, 166 N.E.2d 853, 853, 200 N.Y.S.2d 59, 59-60 (1960).
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Statutory Simplified Procedure
Some states have enacted legislation to provide methods
which permit disputants to resolve their conflicts in a faster, more
informal manner by circumventing traditional courtroom proce-
dure.4 8 New York, for instance, has enacted the "Simplified Proce-
dure for Court Determination of Disputes" (SPCDD),4 9 to provide
such an alternative to ordinary litigation.5 0 Though specifically
4' The excessive amount of money and time required of parties to the judicial process
has provoked the creation of new judicial procedures for civil cases. In 1978, an experimen-
tal "Pilot Project in Economical Litigation" (ELP) was adopted by two municipal and two
superior courts in California. See Note, California's Pilot Project in Economical Litigation,
53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (1980). The program was designed to provide a more simple,
less expensive judicial system for the resolution of small-claim civil cases by simplifying
pleadings, motions, discovery, and trials. Epstein, Reducing Litigation Costs for Small
Cases, 20 JUDGES' J., Spring 1981, at 9, 10; Note, supra, at 1499. Speedy adjudication was
promoted by encouraging trial within 50 days of filing the pretrial memorandum in munici-
pal cases and within 120 days of filing in superior court cases. See Epstein, supra, at 64-65.
Though public ignorance of the program has impeded the full utilization of simplified proce-
dures, the program was reported to be successful in decreasing the time and cost of a typical
case. Id. at 65. In July 1983, a modified version of the ELP, which applied new rules of civil
procedure statewide in municipal courts, went into effect. See CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE §§ 90-
100 (West Supp. 1983). While continuing curbs on motions and pleadings, the revised sys-
tem liberalized discovery techniques to a limited extent. DeBenedictis, Rules Restricting
Civil Procedures Takes Effect Friday, L.A. Daily J., June 27, 1983, at 1, col. 6. Kentucky
has adopted a program that limits the discovery period and fixes a trial date 30 days after
the pretrial conference. Janofsky, supra note 4, at 95. Some courts are using phone-in mo-
tion conferences and videophone arguments to promote judicial economy and efficiency. Ep-
stein, supra, at 66; Hanson, Mahoney, Nejelski & Shuart, Lady Justice-Only a Phone Call
Away, 20 JUDGES' J., Spring 1981, at 40; Janofsky, supra note 4, at 96; Pike, Cure Fails:
Civil Cases Drag On, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 9, 1981, at 21, col. 4.
49 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 3031-3037 (McKinney 1974); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. R. 3032, 3034,
3036 (McKinney 1974). The SPCDD initially was enacted as section 218-a of the Civil Prac-
tice Act, ch. 219, [1956] N.Y. Laws 911 (current version at N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 3031
(McKinney 1974)), which allowed the initiation of an action without service of process and
negated the need for pleadings in some circumstances. In 1961, sections 218-b and 218-c
were added primarily to permit parties contractually to submit controversies under the
modified procedures. FwrH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 97 (1960); see N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAW § 3031, commentary at 597 (McKinney 1974). These three sections of the Civil Practice
Act, together with rules 304, 305, and 306 of the Rules of Civil Practice, were incorporated
into the Civil Practice Laws and Rules when the CPLR replaced the Civil Practice Act and
the Rules of Civil Practice in 1962. N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. LAW § 3031, commentary at 597 (Mc-
Kinney 1974).
go The specified purpose of the SPCDD is "to promote the speedy hearing of [disputes
authorized for settlement under SPCDD] and to provide for such actions a procedure that is
as simple and informal as circumstances will permit." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3035(a) (Mc-
Kinney 1974); see FIFTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 97 (1960); D. SIEGEL, HANDBOOK
ON NEW YORK PRACTICE § 609, at 874 (1978); 3 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW
YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 3031.01 (1980).
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designed for use in the sphere of commercial transactions, 1 the
procedure may be invoked in any dispute52 if included as a con-
tract provision to submit present or future controversies to resolu-
tion under the SPCDD 5
The SPCDD proceeding itself is a hybrid of arbitration and
formal litigation. The SPCDD proceeds on the basis of a jointly
filed statement of claim that sets forth the claims and defenses of
the parties.5 If the parties are unable to agree on a statement of
claim, the court may settle the issues on motion.55 Formal plead-
51 At the time New York adopted the SPCDD, the use of arbitration in the commercial
sector was increasing. In fact, the motivation behind implementation of the SPCDD was to
entice the business community to select the courts for settlement of their disputes. SECOND
ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 18 (1957); see FIFTr ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 99-
100 (1960); D. SmoEL, supra note 50, § 609, at 874; Weinstein, Trends in Civil Practice, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 1431, 1433-34 (1962). Foreign countries, such as Great Britain, France, and
Germany, have established commercial courts, which utilize simplified procedures and are
maintained by judges with a commercial law background, to lure tradesmen back to the use
of litigation. See, e.g., Ferguson, The Adjudication of Commercial Disputes and the Legal
System in Modern England, 7 BRIT. J. L. & Soc'y 141, 146 (1980); see de Seife, A Plea for
the Creation of Commercial Courts, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv. 437, 438 n.7 (1982). While the
caseloads of some of these courts have increased, arbitration is still a favored form of adju-
dication among merchants. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra, at 145-46 (arbitration is most popular
method for resolving commercial disputes in Great Britain).
11 See FIFrH ANN. RFP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 103 (1960); D. SIEG L, supra note 50, §
609, at 876; 3 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, supra note 50, t 3031.02 (1980); Tripp,
Simplified Procedure For Court Determination of Contract Disputes: Judicial "Arbitra-
tion" in New York, N.Y.L.J., October 25, 1961, at 4, col. 1. The SPCDD also has been
utilized in non-commercial contexts, such as disputes involving separation agreements. See,
e.g., Clurman v. Clurman, 84 Misc. 2d 148, 151-52, 373 N.Y.S.2d 951, 955 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1975), aff'd mem., 51 App. Div. 2d 915, 382 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1st Dep't 1976); Backstat-
ter v. Backstatter, 66 Misc. 2d 331, 331, 320 N.Y.S.2d 613, 614 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1971). Although the SPCDD was intended to apply "even in negligence actions," see FIT
ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 103 (1960), it in fact has not been extended to such ac-
tions, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3031, commentary at 595 (McKinney 1974). Nevertheless, most
cases decided under the SPCDD have concerned commercial issues. See, e.g., Aloi v. Board
of Educ., 81 App. Div. 2d 874, 874, 439 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170 (2d Dep't 1981) (action for breach
of collective bargaining agreement); Hurlbert v. Christiano, 63 App. Div. 2d 1116, 1117, 405
N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (4th Dep't 1978) (breach of warranty claim).
53 N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAw § 3033(1) (McKinney 1974); D. SIEGEL, supra note 50, § 609, at
874; see, e.g., Freund v. Washington Square Press, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 379, 381, 314 N.E.2d 419,
420, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (1974). Originally, parties could agree only to submit presently
existing controversies for decision under the SPCDD. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 3033, commen-
tary at 605 (McKinney 1974). The intent behind the change was to allow businessmen to
place clauses compelling the use of SPCDD procedures in contracts as they had done with
arbitration clauses. See FIFTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENCE 97-98 (1960).
" N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3031 (McKinney 1974); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 3032 (McKinney
1974).
.. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 3034(1) (McKinney 1974). A judicial settlement of the parties'
dispute over the statement of claim is similar to an order compelling arbitration under sec-
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ings are dispensed with,5" as are traditional rules of evidence and
procedure,57 unless the court directs otherwise.58 There is no right
to a jury trial,59 and pretrial discovery can be obtained only
through court order.60 Unlike arbitration proceedings, SPCDD pro-
tion 7503(a) of the New York Civil Practice Law, by which the court will require arbitration,
absent a substantial question regarding whether a valid agreement to arbitrate was made.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7503(a) (McKinney 1980); 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 133, 134 (1961).
" N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3031 (McKinney 1974). The SPCDD permits an action to be
commenced or continued on the basis of a statement of the parties' claims and defenses,
which is either signed and acknowledged by the parties or signed by their counsel. Id. Cali-
fornia's Economic Litigation Project (ELP), in contrast, merely limits pleadings to the com-
plaint, answer, cross-complaint, and answer to the cross-complaint. Note, supra note 48, at
1509. The primary function of the pleadings under the ELP was to give notice of the claim.
Id. at 1510. Limiting the pleadings to a brief outline of the claim, with legal arguments to be
developed at trial, would save both time and expense without sacrificing the development of
a litigant's case, particularly if the case is small. See Jewel, Do The Small Claims Courts
Portend an Informal Trial Procedure?, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 458, 494 (1974). But cf. Epstein,
supra note 48, at 12 (lawyers reported by judges to be slow in changing style of pleadings
under ELP).
57 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3035 (McKinney 1974); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 3036 (McKinney
1974); see Mohegan Colony Ass'n v. Picone, 61 App. Div. 2d 809, 810, 402 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41
(2d Dep't 1978). The evidentiary rules pertaining to privileged communications, however,
still apply under the SPCDD. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 3036(1) (McKinney 1974). The court also
has authority to solicit evidence from impartial expert witnesses when necessary. Id.
3036(2).
The relaxation of the rules of evidence under the SPCDD has the advantage of elimi-
nating delay caused by exclusionary rules. FIFTm Am. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 99 (1960).
The Economic Litigation Project in California similarly rendered all relevant evidence not
excluded by privilege or by the Evidence Code admissible. Epstein, supra note 48, at 1506;
see Janofsky, supra note 4, at 95.
" N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 3036(1)' (McKinney 1974). At least one commentator has sug-
gested that allowing a judge summarily to curtail the applicability of simplified procedure
rules may be one of the reasons for the SPCDD's unpopularity. D. SIEGEL, supra note 50, §
609, at 875. It is submitted, however, that allowing the judge to maintain control over proce-
dure is beneficial For example, such control enables him to permit discovery in a particular
case if it seems necessary for a just resolution. See DeBenedictis, supra note 48, at 16, col. 1
(new California civil procedure laws permit judges to sanction additional discovery when
"vitally necessary to a litigant's case").
59 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 3031, 3033(1) (McKinney 1974). There is a right to a jury
trial when the submission of the dispute to the court under the SPCDD, the making of the
contract, or the failure to comply with either submission or contract is at issue. N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. R. 3034 (McKinney 1974). Parties originally were intended to have the right to trial
by jury under the SPCDD. See FIFTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENCE 101 (1960). This was
a result of the legislature's view of SPCDD as combining the advantages of arbitration with
the procedural safeguards of litigation. See id. One advantage of bench trials that is shared
by arbitration is the liberalizing of the rules of evidence. See id.; Janofsky, supra note 4, at
95. Non-jury trials, like arbitration hearings, also are regarded as less expensive than jury
trials and less burdened by delay. See de Seife, supra note 51, at 453. But see Hawkins, The
Case for Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 7 LrIGATON, Fall 1980, at 15, 16
(quicker adjudication via bench trial does not outweigh vital role of jury).
60 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 3036(5) (McKinney 1974). The function of discovery rules is to
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ceedings are bound by formal rules of substantive law and are sub-
ject to judicial review."' The SPCDD therefore offers the speed and
informality of an arbitration proceeding while assuring that tradi-
tional rules of substantive law will guide the tribunal in deciding
the issues.
Statutory simplified procedure appropriately might be em-
ployed in a performance controversy involving a contract term
which had been incorporated by the parties into the agreement in
recognition of traditional judicial principles. Although the SPCDD
has been used infrequently, 2 its existence should be noted by the
practitioner, since there may be circumstances in which the
SPCDD would be the more favored means of conflict resolution for
prevent a litigant from unexpectedly encountering surprise evidence at trial. See Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); 4 J. MooRE & J. LUCAS, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
26.02[2] (2d ed. 1983); Note, supra note 48, at 1500. However, extensive deposition proce-
dures are viewed as leading to delay and greater cost in litigation. See generally 4 J. MooRE
& J. LUCAS, supra, 26.02[3]; DeBenedictis, supra note 48, at 1, col. 6. Under the California
ELP, discovery was limited to inspection, copying and medical examinations for municipal
court cases, and motions were required before depositions were permitted. Epstein, supra
note 48, at 15. More liberal discovery was permitted in superior court cases. Id. A reduction
of 22 discovery events per case was reported, with no significant effect on the outcome of
the lawsuit. McDermott, Equal Justice at Reduced Rates, 20 JUDGEs' J., Spring 1981, at 16,
18-19. The Kentucky program of simplified procedure also limits the number of interrogato-
ries, and grants the right to take depositions of third-party witnesses only if such deposi-
tions are to be introduced at trial. Janofsky, supra note 4, at 95; see also Hufstedler, The
Future of Civil Litigation, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 753, 761 & n.17 (states such as Maryland,
Massachusetts, and Minnesota have reported favorable results from limiting number of
interrogatories).
61 SECOND ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENCE 18 (1957); see Fxnmi ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD.
CONFERENCE 103 (1960); 28 BROOKLYN L. REV., supra note 55, at 135. Although judicial re-
view is available for SPCDD proceedings, the judge's findings of fact will be upheld on ap-
peal if supported by substantial evidence. 28 BROOKLYN L. REV., supra note 55, at 134; D.
SIEGEL, supra note 50, § 609, at 876. Substantive law is applied under the SPCDD to pro-
vide legal safeguards for litigants that might not exist at arbitration. FIFTH ANN. REP. N.Y.
JUD. CONFERENCE 100 (1960).
62 See D. SIEGEL, supra note 50, § 609, at 874; Weinstein, supra note 51, at 1434
(SPCDD will not significantly reduce the number of controversies decided by arbitration).
There are, however, aspects to the SPCDD that might induce a party to invoke it instead of
arbitration. Under the SPCDD, the judge is empowered to set the number of witnesses to be
heard. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. 3034(5) (McKinney 1979). Thus, a judge can obtain the testimony
of qualified experts to decide technical issues. Jaffe, Simplified Procedure for Determina-
tion of Disputes Compared with Arbitration and Ordinary Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 14,
1961, at 4, col. 1. A judge also is more likely than an arbitrator to be impartial. Id. Although
arbitrators usually are more qualified in a specialized field, the development of judges
versed in the intricacies of various types of litigation-tort, commercial, or matrimo-
nial-would be attractive to those seeking a specialist to resolve a dispute. Cf. de Seife,
supra note 51, at 449-52 (suggesting combination of arbitration with a commercial court
system).
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the client.
Rent-A-Judge
The rent-a-judge system, a new method of dispute resolution,
has been widely employed by disputing parties in California, 3 and
more recently in the East,64 to avoid the litigation process. This
method of conflict resolution, like arbitration, requires the parties
to agree to accept a private settlement of their differences.6 5 Pursu-
ant to such an agreement, the parties petition the court for an or-
der submitting their dispute to a referee." They then hire a refe-
63 CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE §§ 638-645 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983). Although resort to a
private judge, or consensual referencing, has been permitted in California since 1872, it gen-
erally was not used until 1976, and since has increased in popularity as a method of dispute
resolution. Christensen, Private Justice: California's General Reference Procedure, 1982
AM. B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 79, 80-81. The California reference procedure has gained na-
tional attention in the press. See, e.g., Rent-a-Judge, ECONOMIST, Nov. 29, 1980, at 38; Rent-
a-Judge, TImE, Apr. 20, 1981, at 51; Retired Judges Hired to Decide Lawsuits in Private,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1980, at A25, col. 1; Hill, Rent-a-Judge: California is Allowing its
Wealthy Litigants to Hire Private Jurists, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 1. For a
general overview of the California reference system, see Note, supra note 1, at 1597-99.
4 See, e.g., ch. 840, [1983] N.Y. Laws 1601-05 (to be codified in scattered sections of
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 3104-8003, N.Y. Jun. LAw §§ 850-854, and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§
255.20-380.10). New York recently has created a referencing system in which retired judges
will be paid by the state to hold pretrial hearings in criminal cases and to hear certain
misdemeanor cases and pretrial motions in civil matters. Ch. 840, §§ 850, 852, 854, [1983]
N.Y. Laws 1601-03; see also Barbanel, Retired Judges to Help Clear Court Backlog, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 17, 1983, at B22, col. 1. This new system represents a systematic tempering of
the rent-a-judge procedures that exist in California. See supra note 48; cf. Barbanel, supra,
at B22, col. 1. Today, all states except Illinois and Louisiana permit referencing to some
extent. Note, supra note 1, at 1594; see, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 515.010-.230 (Vernon 1952).
Some states have reference statutes similar to California's statute. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
515.010-.230 (Vernon 1952); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 612-615 (West 1960); OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 17.705-.990 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-15-1 to -21 (1970 & Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-31-10 to -150 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.48.010-
.100 (1979). Most states tend to view their statutes as providing only for nonconsensual
reference. Christensen, supra note 63, at 80. Fourteen states have reference statutes that are
based on rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits reference only in
exceptional circumstances. E.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 53(b); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 53(b); IND. TsAL R.
53(b); see FED. R. Civ. P. 53. Some states have omitted the exceptional circumstances re-
quirement. E.g., MAss. R. Civ. P. 53; Omo R. Civ. P. 53. For a categorization of all the state
reference statutes, see Note, supra note 1, at 1592-97.
6" E.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 638 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); see Christensen, supra
note 63, at 81; Rent-a-Judge, TIME, Apr. 20, 1981, at 51.
6" E.g., CAL. CirV. PROC. CODE § 638 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983). The trial judge has
discretion in granting petitions for referencing, and such decisions will not be disturbed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 118 Cal. App. 2d 399, 257 P.2d
1002, 1002-03 (1953). References may be either general or special. A general reference is a
mandate "to try any or all of the issues in an action or proceeding, whether of fact or of law,
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ree,6 7 who typically is a former judge,6 s to hear the dispute.69 This
hearing proceeds at a time and place convenient to the referee, the
parties, and their witnesses. 70 The referee then files a report with
the trial court, and the report, by statute, has the effect of the
findings of the trial court upon which judgment may be entered.7 1
and to report a finding and judgment thereon," CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 638(1) (West 1976 &
Supp. 1983), and a special reference is used "to ascertain a fact necessary to enable the
court to determine an action or proceeding," id. § 638(2). In California, a reference may be
obtained up to the eve of trial. Note, supra note 1, at 1597. Along with the petition, the
attorney must stipulate the individual chosen as referee, the compensation to be paid if the
jurisdiction allows private payment, the amount of discovery to be performed, and the par-
ties' willingness to be bound by the decision. Id. at 1597 n.22.
61 See Christensen, supra note 63, at 81. In many states, the parties may select up to
three referees. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 640 (West 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 615
(1960). In some, the amount of the referee's compensation is fixed by agreement of the
parties. Christensen, supra note 63, at 82. Different states prescribe different methods of
allocating payment. In some states, the parties must share the costs. E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §
645.1 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4321 (McKinney 1963); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-31-150 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982). Others require the losing party to pay the costs.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-434 (1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 612-624 (1960). Still
other states pay the costs out of the state treasury. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 493-
A:2 (1968 & Supp. 1979); see IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-1-1 to -26 (West 1976). Private pay-
ments to referees range from $50 to $100 per hour and from $300 to $750 per day of trial
Christensen, supra note 63, at 83.
68 In some states, a referee selected by agreement of the parties need not possess any
specific qualifications. See, e.g., N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAW § 4312(1) (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1982); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 615 (1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-15-1 (1970). Other states require
the referee to be a retired judge if the decision is to be considered final. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-434 (1960 & Supp. 1983-1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 493-A1 (1983).
South Carolina limits reference to standing masters, but the trial court may permit consen-
sual referencing to an agreed upon third party at the court's discretion. S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-31-150 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
89 Christensen, supra note 63, at 81. The format of the reference hearing differs from
state to state. In California, for example, a reference hearing resembles an arbitration hear-
ing but, unlike arbitration, must employ the traditional rules of procedure and evidence.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 300 (West 1966 & Supp. 1983). Some states require trial-like hearings.
E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1131 (1979); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4318 (McKinney 1963 &
Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-31-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Other states encourage refer-
ence proceedings to be informal. See Florida Hill Road Corp. v. Commission, 164 Conn. 360,
367, 321 A.2d 856, 859-60 (1973) (hearing by referee need not be completely formal); RIL
GEN. LAWS § 9-15-4 (1969) (parties decide rules of procedure to be employed).
70 E.g., Christensen, supra note 63, at 81-83; Note, supra note 1, at 1598; Rent-a-Judge,
TimE, Apr. 20, 1981, at 51.
71 E.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 644 (West 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-434 (1983);
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 4319 (McKinney 1963). The constitutionality of entering a final judg-
ment on a referee's report was upheld in Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 413 A.2d 819,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 801 (1979). But cf. N.H. REy. STAT. ANN. ch. 493-A:1 (Supp. 1979)
(retired judge not permitted to enter final verdicts). A party may move for a new trial and if
the motion is denied, may appeal from the final judgment. E.g., In re Riccardi, 80 Cal. App.
66, 71, 251 P. 650, 653 (1926).
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The system thus provides the benefits of arbitration with the addi-
tional advantage that experienced adjudicators can be secured. In
addition, the privacy offered by the rent-a-judge system may be
appealing to the parties. If a lawsuit would prove embarrassing to
an individual party on a personal or professional level, the rent-a-
judge system remains a viable forum because it is a private pro-
ceeding.72 Although it has been criticized as being violative of due
process,73 equal protection" and the first amendment, 75 and al-
though some commentators fear that it may create an inherently
biased private judiciary,76 the rent-a-judge system still constitutes
71 Christensen, supra note 63, at 84; Hill, supra note 63, at 15, col 3; Note, supra note
1, at 1599-1600.
73 See Note, supra note 1, at 1606-08. Several different due process arguments can be
made against a reference system involving private payment. The argument that the poor are
denied due process because they do not have effective access to the reference system is
meaningful only if they are incapable of receiving any kind of a constitutionally fair hearing
through the ordinary judicial system. Id. at 1606-07. The argument is weakened further by
the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize an absolute right to a civil hearing. See, e.g., Bod-
die v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). A more viable argument would be that refer-
ence allows the rich to purchase at will a better quality of adjudication than the poor. Note,
supra note 1, at 1601. This type of problem is eliminated, of course, by state payment of
referees. Id. at 1608.
74 See Christensen, supra note 63, at 91-93; Note, supra note 1, at 1601-06. The equal
protection argument against the private referee system is based on the proposition that es-
tablishment of such a system divides the class of all litigants into two groups: those who can
afford a referee and those who cannot. Note, supra note 1, at 1601. The latter group cannot
benefit from the advantages of reference over traditional litigation and thus is at a disad-
vantage. Id. at 1601-02. Such a classification does not merit strict scrutiny, however, since
the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that wealth alone is not a suspect classification. See,
e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321-26 (1980). It is possible, however, to argue that
consensual reference violates equal protection by showing that this classification is not sig-
nificantly related to an important governmental interest. Note, supra note 1, at 1603.
Though the Court has never applied such midlevel scrutiny to a classification based on
financial status, it has suggested that poverty, in combination with other factors, might jus-
tify such scrutiny. Id. at 1604; see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977).
75 See Note, supra note 1, at 1608-10. An argument that private reference violates the
first amendment necessarily assumes that all Americans have the right to review civil trials.
See Christensen, supra note 64, at 93. The public, however, has never been held to possess a
constitutional right to attend civil trials. Note, supra note 1, at 1609. Compare Note, Trial
Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial Proceedings, 91
HARv. L. REv. 1899, 1921-23 (1978) (arguing for a public right to view civil trials despite the
dearth of supporting case law) with Note, All Courts Shall Be Open: The Public's Right to
View Judicial Proceedings and Records, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 311, 311 (1979) (noting that the
"requirement of public civil trials," though not constitutionally mandated, is as old as the
requirement of public criminal trials).
76 See Note, supra note 1, at 1607-08. It has been argued that when referees are pri-
vately paid, they tend to favor those litigants who are more likely to bring them future
business. Id.; see Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 202 S.E.2d 628, 631 (W. Va. 1974). As a result, these
"steady customers" would receive more favorable verdicts over time than parties less famil-
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a viable alternative to traditional judicial proceedings.
Mediation
Mediation is a nonjudicial mode of conflict resolution in which
a neutral third party employs nonadversarial techniques in order
to reconcile the conflicting positions held by the parties.7 7 It is the
least formal method of dispute settlement, since a mediator is not
subject to the constraints of either contract or statute and thus has
broad powers to encourage settlement.78 It is also, as a general rule,
more rapid and less expensive than other forms of conflict resolu-
tion.7 9 Mediation, however, differs from other methods of dispute
resolution in that the result of the mediation process is not en-
forceable by court sanction. 0 Its effectiveness in resolving contro-
versies is therefore maximized when it is employed by the parties
as a first attempt to settle their differences, that is, before they
have submitted the dispute to a more formal forum such as an ar-
bitration proceeding. If they are able to reach an agreement after
mediation, further proceedings will be unnecessary. Even if the
parties are unable to effectuate a settlement at this stage, however,
the mediation procedure will have clarified the issues that must be
resolved, expediting subsequent proceedings. The procedure is ef-
iar with the reference system. Note, supra note 1, at 1608.
7K. BRAUN, LABOR DIsPuTEs AND THEIR SETTLEmENT 53-55 (1955); W. SIMFN, MEDIA-
'ION AND THE DYNAMIcs OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 25-40 (1971). The term mediation,
though normally used interchangeably with the word conciliation, implies a larger amount
of active intervention in the dispute. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, GENEVA, CONCILIATION
IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 1 n.1 (1973); W. MAGGIOLO, TECHNIQUES OF MEDIATION IN LABOR
DISPUTES 10 (1971). A conciliator merely brings the parties together in a non-adversarial
setting to solve their dispute themselves, whereas a mediator participates in the parties'
negotiations, making suggestions when appropriate. W. MAGGIOLO, supra, at 10; W. SIMKIN,
supra, at 25-26.
7'8 See McGinness & Cinquegrana, Legal Issues Arising in Mediation: The Boston Mu-
nicipal Court Mediation Program, 67 MAss. L. REV. 123, 133 (1982); Re, The Lawyer as
Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 685, 694-96 (1982); Riskin,
Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 35 (1982). A variant of mediation is the so-
called "mini-hearing," or "mini-trial," in which parties attempt to reach a negotiated settle-
ment in complex litigation. See Parker & Radoff, The Mini-Hearing: An Alternative to
Protracted Litigation of Factually Complex Disputes, 38 Bus. LAw. 35 (1982).
70 McGinness & Cinquegrana, supra note 78, at 123; Riskin, supra note 78, at 34; Wil-
liams, supra note 4, at 86, 88.
80 See W. SIMKIN, supra note 77, at 27-29. Whereas an arbitrator may render a binding
decision, a mediator does not have such authority. Id. at 28. The sole purpose of a media-
tor's intervention is to facilitate and encourage an expeditious settlement actually forged by
the parties themselves. See K. BRAUN, supra note 77, at 35-36; W. MAGGIOLO, supra note 77,
at 57.
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fective because a mediator does not decide a dispute but rather
helps the parties reach their own resolution, thus fostering the con-
tinuance of the relationship between the parties, who generally
must continue to work together.
CONCLUSION
Parties are opting for unconventional forums to resolve their
conflicts with increasing frequency as a result of mounting conges-
tion in the court system. Use of such alternative forums may bene-
fit not only the litigants by facilitating the resolution of their dis-
pute, but also may help reduce bulging court dockets. Since the
task of choosing the most appropriate forum for issue resolution
falls to the negotiating lawyer, he should have some familiarity
with the nature and components of alternative modes of dispute
resolution. To best perform his function, the lawyer must analyze
potential conflicts in light of the alternative modes of conflict reso-
lution available and select the forum that will best protect the cli-
ent's interests. The above observations are offered as guidelines
which should be pondered in selecting a forum for the resolution of
a business dispute. Used effectively by practitioners, they may im-
prove the quality of justice available to those who turn to our judi-
cial system.
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